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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was initiated by Respondents to exercise a
forfeiture provision in a Uniform Real Estate Contract due to
Appellant's alleged failure to pay real property taxes for the
years 1976, 1978, and 1979.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On November 10, 1981, the action was tried before the
Court sitting without a jury.

The Court

found

that

the

Ap-

pellant's had failed to pay the said property taxes as required
by the terms of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract, and
entered a Judgment of forfeiture awarding possession of the real
property to

Respondents,

a·nd

ordered

Respondents

to pay

Ap-

pellant's the sum of $1,000 for their interest in the property.
Appellants brought a Motion for a New Trial which was denied by
the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants, Christian A. Anderson and Linda P. Anderson,
seek a Decree reversing the Judgment of the trial court and an
Order for entry of Judgment consistent with the laws of the State
of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the
Brief of Appellants and will be reiterated here only to the
extent necessary for an understanding of the points raised.

On

October 30, 1975, the Respondents sold by Uniform Real Estate
Contract property located in Alpine, Utah to Appellants (Tr. 12).
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The total purchase price was $20,000.

$3,000 down payment was

made and Appellants agreed to pay the $17,000 balance in installments of $147.53 over a twenty (20) year period.

In addition to

the monthly payments, Appellants agreed, pursuant to paragraph 11
of the contract, to pay the general taxes arising after 1975.

No

installment payments were ever missed.
Evidently,

there

was

some

problem

with

the

parties

receiving tax notices for the years subsequent to 1975.
Respondents-Sellers

The

do not recall receiving the tax notices for

1976 or 1978 (Tr. 26), and the Appellants-Buyers do not recall
receiving the Notices for 1976 and 1978 (Tr. 34).
for 1977 was received by the Respondents
to and paid by the Appellants (Tr.
received the 1979 tax notice,

(Tr.

34).

The tax notice

26), and was sent

When the Respondents

they elected to

pay

all

taxes

current and on November 14, 1979, made demand upon Appellants for
reimbursement of the 1976, 1978, and 1979 taxes in the total
of $690.93 (Tr. 27).

sum

Upon receipt of the Respondents' letter for

reimbursement, the Appellants immediately informed

Respondents

that, upon receipt and proof of payment of the prior years taxes,
reimbursement would be made immediately (Tr. 27-28).
March 18,

Not until

1980, did the new attorney for the Respondents com-

municate with Appellants as to the proof of prior taxes paid by
the

Respondents

Respondents

made

(Tr.

37).

demand

for

In

his

letter,

reimbursement

the

attorney

within

five

for
days

pursuant to paragraph 14 of the contract between the parties
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(Exhibit

9).

Promptly,on

March

21,

1980,

the

attorney

for

Appellants responded and indicated that the taxes would immediately be

reimbursed

upon

receipt

of the

tax

bill

from

the

request

for

Respondents (Tr. 38) (Exhibit 10).
Instead

of

responding

to

Appellants'

verification of taxes paid, the Respondents served a Notice to
Quit upon the Appellants on April 22, 1980, over one month after
the March 18, 1980 five day demand for payment.

The Notice to

Quit gave the Appellants five days to vacate the premises.
Prior to the Notice to Quit, on May 14, 1980, Appellants
tendered

a

check

for

Respondents (Tr. 39).

the

unpaid

taxes

to

the

On May 23, 1980, counsel for

attorney

for

Respondents

returned the payment, stating that the amount tendered did not
constitute the full

amount demanded in the original letter of

March 18, 1980 and was not timely (Tr. 39) (Exhibit 12). Counsel
for Appellants then tendered the full amount requested, $788.93,
on June 4, 1980, which was again returned by counsel for Respondents (Tr. 40)

(Exhibit 13).

On June 19, 1980, two months after the Notice to Vacate,
Respondents commenced an action for

unlawful detainer.

At the

trial of the action, the Court ruled that there was a breach of
the contract justifying a forfeiture of the Appellants'
in

the

real

property

(Tr.

67).

Although

the

interest

Appellants

had

dutifully made the required contract payments for over six (6)
years, and had promptly responded to the Respondents letter of

-3-
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March 18, 1980 agreeing to reimburse for taxes paid upon proper
proof of payment, the Court forfeited the Appellants'
upon payment of $1,000 by Respondents.

interest

Consequently, Appellants

lost their property and lost their payments.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS ELECTED THEIR REMEDY TO PAY THE
TAXES AND SEEK REIMBURSEMENT PROVIDED IN
PARAGRAPH FOURTEEN OF THE CONTRACT.
Respondents argue in their brief that nothing in the
contract between the parties requires the seller to pursue a
money judgment against the buyer if the seller pays the property
taxes.

With this contention

the Appellants disagree.

Paragraph fourteen of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
contains the exclusive remedy provision available to the seller
in the event of non-payment of taxes by a Buyer.

That paragraph

provides as follows:
"14.
In the event the Buyer shall default
in the payment of any special or general taxes,
assessments, or insurance premiums as herein
provided, the Seller, may, at his option, pay
said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums
or either of them, and if Seller elects so to
do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller
upon demand, all such sums so advanced and paid
by him, together with interest thereon .
"
(emphasis added)

-4-
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In this case, the Respondents elected to pay the taxes
under paragraph fourteen,~and the

Respondents are limited to

their reimbursement rights under that provision. The Appellants
never denied their obligation to reimburse Respondents,
contacted Respondents,

and tendered payment twice

promptly
before the

Respondents commenced their unlawful detainer action.
Paragraph sixteen
Contract

contains

the

of the underlying Uniform Real Estate

remedy

provisions

applicable

to

the

non-payment of the regular monthly payments, and does not apply
once the Seller elects the remedy in paragraph fourteen to pay
unpaid

taxes

and

seek

reimbursement.

This

construction

supported by language in paragraph 16B of the Contract,
provides

that

in

is

which

the event of default by the Buyer, or upon

failure of the Buyer to make any payment or payments when the
same shall become due,
Judgment for

the Seller may bring suit and recover

all delinquent installments, including costs and

attorney's fees.

The remedy provisions in paragraph sixteen were

not

the

intended

by

parties

to

apply

to

delinquent

taxes.

Otherwise, the remedy provision in paragraph fourteen pertaining
specifically to the non-payment of taxes would be mere surplusage.
Appellants construction of the meaning of

paragraphs

fourteen and sixteen of the agreement are bolstered by a recent
law review article cited by the Respondents on page six of their
brief.

In '' For f e it u r e Un d er Ins t a 11 men t Land con tr a c t s In Ut ah" ,
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4 Utah Law Rev.
with

respect

to

803,

805 (1981),

the

nonpayment

the author states as follows
of

taxes

as

opposed

to

the

nonpayment of the regular installment payments:

"Further, should the Buyer fail to pay
assessments, insurance or taxes on the property
when due, the Seller may make the payments and
charge them to the Buyer's balance.
(Citing
c 1 au s e 1 4, Uni form Re a 1 Est ate Contract ) •
If
the Buyer defaults on the installment payments,
the contract gives the Seller three options: he
may abandon the contract and declare a forfeiture; he may sue for all past due payments;
or, he may proceed to foreclose the Buyer's
interest as would any mortgagee.
(Citing
paragraph 16, Uniform Real Estate Contract)
(emphasis added)".
By paying the delinquent property taxes and then seeking
reimbursement from

Appellants,

the Respondents elected their

remedy and should have been barred from pursuing the inconsistent
and alternative remedy of forfeiture.

Although the Appellants

tendered reimbursement in accordance with paragraph fourteen, the
Respondents declared that the contract was also terminated under
paragraph sixteen since the reimbursement was not made within
five days.

There is no five day deadline in paragraph fourteen.
It was inconsistent for the Respondents,

on the one

hand, to affirm the agreement by paying the taxes and requesting
repayment from Appellants, and to also terminate the contract by
forfeiting

the Appellants interest thereby retaining all the

down and regular monthly payments as liquidated damages.
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In the case of Cook v. Covey - Ballard Motor Company, 69
Utah 161

253 P.

196,

200 (1927),

the Utah Supreme Court stated

the basis for the concept of election of remedies:

"The doctrine of an election rests upon the
principle that one may not take contrary
positions, and where he has a right to choose
one of two modes of redress, and the two are so
inconsistent that the assertion of one involves
a negation or repudiation of the other, the
deliberate and settled choice of one, with
knowledge or means of knowledge of such facts
as would authorize a resort to each, will
preclude him thereafter from going back and
electing again."
In Cook, supra, the Court also stated:
"The true rule seems· to be (1) that there
must be, in fact, two or more coexisting
remedies upon which the party has the right to
elect;
(2) the remedies thus open to him must
be alternative and inconsistent; and (3)
he
must actually bring an action or by some other
decisive act with knowledge of the facts,
indicate his choice between these inconsistent
remedies."
By electing under paragraph fourteen to pay the taxes
and seek repayment, the Respondents should not have been allowed
to go back and elect paragraph sixteen as the applicable remedy.
At a minimum, the remedy provided in paragraph fourteen
is one of two co-existing remedies upon which the Seller has the
right to elect, and the elected remedy of payment and reimbursement

is

alternative

to

and

inconsistent

with

the

remedy

forfeiture.
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of

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE
FORFEITURE REMEDY UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE
Respondents

argue

in

their

brief that

the

Judgment

entered by the trial court was not unreasonable, unconscionable,
nor in the nature of a penalty.

However, the parties testified

at

not

trial

that

Appellants

had

failed

to make

any of the

required installment payments. They had paid $3,000 down payment
for the property and had made over $2,000 worth of improvements.
The contract had been in force for a six year period and Appellants had made total payments of over $13,000.
For the trial Court to order the forfeiture of all but
$1,000 worth of payments and improvements, as well as forfeiture
of the property,

all because Appellants had not tendered the

$690.83 as reimbursement

for

taxes within the stated five day

period, was clearly unconscionable and so harsh as to shock the
conscience.
In Johnson v.

Carman, 572 P.2d 371

(Utah, 1977), this

Court stated that the law in Utah with respect to such forfeiture
provisions appears well settled.
P.2d 709 (Utah,

Quoting from Kay v. Wood, 549

1976), the Court in Johnson, supra, expressed

the following regarding forfeiture provisions in real estate contracts:
"This Court has long been committed to the
rule that parties to a contract may agree as to
the amount of liquidated damages that shall be
-8-
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paid in the case of a breach, that the agreement is enforceable if the amount stipulated to
is not disproportionate to the damages actually
sustained.
The provision in a contract for the
sale of real property that all payments which
have been made may be forfeited as liquidated
damages will not be enforced if the forfeiture
will be grossly excessive and disproportionate
t o a n y p o s s i b 1 e 1 o s s s o · a s t o s h o c· k t h e
conscience.
(Citations omitted)"
In citing from the Restatement of Contracts,

Section

339,

also cited with approval in Perkins v.

468,

243 P.2d 446 (1952), the Court in Johnson v. Carman, supra,

went on to adopt the following

Spencer, 121 Utah

rule with respect to liquidated

damages:
"(1) An agreement made in advance of breach
fixing the damages therefore, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the
damages recoverable for the breach unless:
(a)
the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of
just compensation for the harm that is caused
by the breach; and (b) the harm that is caused
by the breach is one that is incapable or very
difficult of accurate estimation. (Emphasis
added)"
In

this

case,

the

damages

constituting

the

breach

are

very

capable of accurate estimation, because they are for the nonpayment of taxes which can be calculated exactly.
The primary reason for the requirement that damages be
difficult to estimate,

is that when they are ascertainable, the

exact damages determined at the time of breach will nearly always
be more fair than those guessed at by the parties at the time of
contracting.

Johnson v. Carman,

-9-

supra at p. 373-373.

In this
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action, the amount of the unpaid taxes is capable of accurate
estimation and reimbursement by Appellants will make the Respondents whole and provide both parties with the benefit of their
bargain.

To allow Respondents to retain payments and improve-

ments worth over $15,000 because of a delay in the reimbursement
of

$690, is disproportionate and shocking to the conscience

within the meaning of prior cases decided by this Court.

POINT III
ASSUMING THAT FORFEITURE WAS AN AVAILABLE
REMEDY TO RESPONDENTS, RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR
RIGHT TO DECLARE A FORFEITURE AND COMMENCE AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BY REASON OF THEIR
PAST INCONSISTENT CONDUCT
The Respondents argue in their brief that they did not
waive their right to claim a forfeiture, and that the Appellants'
conduct

justified

the

strict

application

of

the

forfeiture

provision to the Appellants' interest in the property.

However,

testimony at trial indicated that the Respondents themselves did
not strictly comply with the terms of the contract

and

they

thereby waived their right to exact strict compliance from the
Appellants.
The Respondents testified that when they received the
1977 tax notice,

they delivered the notice to the

Appellants'

brother, and that the taxes for that year were paid by Appellants
(Tr. 35).
the

Respondents made no further inquiry on the status of

payment

of taxes

until

1979,

at

which

time

received the 1979 tax notice indicating that taxes

Respondents
for 1976 and
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1978 were

also owing (Tr.

22-23).

Instead of sending the 1979

Appellants~brother

notice to Appellants or

for payment, this time

the Respondents paid the taxes and demanded reimbursement.

The

Appellants also testified that they relied on the Respondents to
forward tax notices for payment (Tr. 34-35).
Although the taxes had not been paid as far back as
1976,

the Respondents waited until late 1979 and early 1980 to

strictly hold Appellants to the terms of the contract.

Further-

more, once the Respondents' attorney sent a five day demand for
payment on March 18, 1980, the counsel for Appellants immediately
responded acknowledging the obligation of the Appellants. Instead
of immediately responding to the letter from Appellants' counsel,
the

attorney

for

failed to reply at all until a

Respondents

Not ice to Quit the premises was served upon Appellants a month
later on April 2 2' 1980.
Upon
Appellants

of

learning

tendered

the

Notice

the

amount

of

the

to

counsel

Quit,

unpaid

taxes

to

for
the

attorney for Respondents, who returned the payment on May 23,
198 O for

the

reason

that

it

did

not

constitute

the

amount

demanded in the letter of March 18, 1980, nor was it paid within
five days.

Counsel for Appellants then tendered the full

amount

requested on March 18, 1980, which was also returned on June 12,
198 0.

a b ou t

The unlawful detainer action was then commenced on or
J une

19 ,

1980,

Over t hree months

from the date of the

original five day demand.
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The

Respondents,

by

their

estopped from strictly enforcing
against Appellants.

prior

the

five

conduct,

should

day demand

be

period

Waiver or estoppel is a doctrine of equity

proposed to rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, been
deluded
another.
1976).

into

a course

of action

by the wrong

Morgan v. Board of State Lands,

or

neglect of

549 P.2d 695 (Utah,

In the instant case, the Appellants quickly contacted

Respondents in response to the five day demand for payment sent
March 18, 1980.

No legal action was taken for over three months

after the five day notice was sent.

By not quickly informing

Appellants or their attorney upon receipt of the March 21, 1980
request for proof of payment, that the five day period would be
strictly enforced,
three months,

and by failing to take legal action for over

Respondents waived their right to refuse later

payment on the grounds that it was not strictly tendered within
the original five day demand period.

POINT IV

ASSUMING FORFEITURE WAS A REMEDY AVAILABLE TO
RESPONDENTS, THE FIVE DAY PERIOD GIVEN TO
APPELLANTS TO. CURE THEIR DEFAULT ON MARCH 18,
1980 WAS UNREASONABLE AND ARBITRARY.
The record in this case reflects that the Appellants are
residents of the State of New Mexico,

and did not

personally

reside in the residence being purchased from Respondents.
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The

five. day demand letter sent in accordance with pa~agraph 16A of
the contract, and dated March 18, 1980, was addressed to the
Appellants in Sante Fe,

New Mexico.

The letter provided that

unless reimbursement was made to Respondents within five days
after

receipt

of

written

notice,

the

Respondents

would

be

released from all obligations in law and equity to convey said
property.
In
(Utah,

Corporation

Nine

v.

Taylor,

513

P.2d 417,

421

1973), the Supreme Court of Utah stated as follows with

respect to the usual

five day notice

period

provided

in

the

Uniform Real Estate Contract:

"We agree that in the situation of the
usual Real Estate Contract, and perhaps even in
this one, the five day notice to perform might
be unreasonable and arbitrary if a more
reasonable and longer time would have been of
any benefit to the Buyer."
In this action, more time certainly would have been of
benefit to the Appellants, since they contacted an attorney in
American Fork, Utah to respond to the demand letter of March 18,
198 0.

The Appellants attorney immediately contacted counsel for

Respondents

and

acknowledged

that

upon

receipt

of

notices, reimbursement would be paid without difficulty.

the

tax

Conse-

quently, negotiations were underway to resolve the dispute, but
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to

limit

negotiations

and

final

settlement to

five days was

unreasonable and arbitrary and should not have been enforced by
the Court.
CONCLUSION
An interpretation of the contract in this action leads
to the conclusion that the Respondents elected their remedy under
paragraph

fourteen of the agreement when they paid the prior

years taxes and sought reimbursement

from the Appellants.

The

Appellants did not dispute the obligation to pay the taxes, and
acted reasonably in response to the Respondents requests
payment.

for

The damages to the Respondents were clear and ascer-

tainable and a tender of payment was made within
period of time.

a reasonable

It would be harsh and inequitable for this Court

to rule that the Appellants were strictly bound by the provisions
and time periods set forth in the forfeiture provision of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract due to the Respondents'
compliance and due to the

own lack of

grossly excessive and disproportionate

loss suffered by the Appellants as a result of the trial Court's
strict application and enforcement of the forfeiture provision.
For these reasons,

Appellants respectfully request this Court to

reverse the decision below.
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DATED this

7

rJf

~day of December, 1982.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

,BRAD-R •. BALDWIN
/Attorneys for Appellants
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that

I mailed two true and correct

copies of the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to:

Heber Grant

Ivins, Attorney for Respondents, 75 North Center, American Fork,
Utah

84003, postage prepaid on the

.,.;1

7 --Elay of December, 1982.
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